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TOO BIG TO MANAGE: A CASE FOR STRICTER
BANK MERGER REGULATION
Peter Lim Felton*
“We have a new kind of bank. It is called too big to fail.1
TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank.”
- Congressman Stewart McKinney2
“It is well enough that people of the nation do not
understand our banking and money system, for if they did,
I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow
morning.”
- Henry Ford3
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INTRODUCTION
Bank failure lies at the center of the Great Recession,
which has shaken the financial strength of the United States.
Worse, there is a growing public distrust of government
motives.4 Disagreement with policymakers’ decisions has
4. See Beth Fouhy, Democrats See Minefield in Occupy Protests, BUSINESS
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fueled much of the American public’s disapproval of the
government, voiced most recently by the Tea Party and
Occupy Movements.
Many argue that the federal
government’s decision to bail out failing banks in 2008 during
the Great Recession lies at the center of this public
discontent.5 The government defended its action as the only
feasible option because allowing the banks to fail would prove
disastrous for America.6
The government’s bailouts, however, should not be the
focus of the public’s frustration and outrage. The real culprits
are the bank mergers that created mammoth banks causing
the government to feel forced to save private banks with
public money. How were banks allowed to merge and reach
such unmanageable sizes? Should these mergers have even
been allowed?
This Comment seeks to address these questions and
discuss the soundness of the government’s decision to
sanction these mergers. Part I commences with delving into
America’s banking history by exploring the federal
governments’ initial regulation of the banking system, the
subsequent deregulation, and relevant banking statutes.7
Part II provides an explanation of the first praised, and then
denounced, concept of “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF)—which
suggests that if banks were large enough, they would not
fail.8 Part III conducts a crucial legal analysis of the mergers
creating TBTF banks, evaluating their admissibility
according to banking statutes and antitrust laws.9 Lastly,
Part IV discusses and proposes necessary modifications to the
current banking system in the hopes of preventing further
creation of TBTF banks and provides a possible solution to
America’s current dilemma.10

WEEK (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9R2J30G0.htm; Russ Roberts, Occupy Wall Street and Washington’s History of
Financial Bailouts: Why We Need More Capitalism, Not Less, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Oct.
21,
2011),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136609/russroberts/occupy-wall-street-and-washingtons-history-of-financial-bailouts.
5. Fouhy, supra note 4; Roberts, supra note 4.
6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:
REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2008 1 (2009).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
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OVERVIEW OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Useful Definitions
Banks are invaluable to our society. They provide both a
location for people to (relatively) safely hold their money and
a supply of money to persons or businesses. A bank’s most
basic function is to receive money from individuals and to
then loan that money to other account holders.11 A more
encompassing definition of banks defines them as “public
[financial] institutions, for the custody and loan of money, the
exchange and transmission of the same by means of bills and
drafts, and the issuance of [their] own promissory notes,
payable to bearer, as currency, or for the exercise of one or
more of these functions . . . regulated by the law.”12
Two terms used in this Comment are commercial banks
and investment banks.13 “[C]ommercial banks offer a full
range of banking services, including demand accounts (i.e.,
checking accounts) for business and personal use, savings and
time deposits, investment and loan services, trust department
services, and the like.”14 Investment banks, on the other
hand, are “financial intermediaries whose business consists
in underwriting and distributing securities and acting as
brokers and dealers in securities already distributed.”15 The
distinction between these two types of banks is important
because they receive dissimilar regulatory treatment.
Commercial banking statutes are generally more stringent
than investment banking.16
B. Concept of Banking Regulation
To better appreciate banking regulation, it is important
to first understand why it is necessary. It is essential for
basically two reasons: 1) banks hold a large amount of money
11. See M.J. DEVINE & P.A. ERNEST, MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING 7
(2011).
12. Id. at 7–8 (citations omitted).
13. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR REGULATORS 41
(Anderson Publishing Co. 1992).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Implications of the ‘Volcker Rules’ for Financial Stability: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 45–
49 (2010) [hereinafter Volcker Rules] (statement of Simon Johnson).
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that is not their own, and 2) banks are involved in the risky
business of lending money to borrowers who may or may not
pay the banks back. By holding and lending out money,
banks impact the economy enormously. “[Banking’s] very
nature . . . makes it peculiarly an object of legislative
solicitude in order that depositors and stockholders may be
protected.”17
Its business also strongly impacts public
interest through its lending function, which has an innate
level of risk not present in most other businesses.18 Banking
is speculative and volatile in nature and opens the door for
illegal and unscrupulous behavior.19
The justice system is not “eager to intrude into the
business practices” of banks, but banking regulation is
necessary for public welfare.20 The following legal definition
of a bank explains its status as a corporation and subordinate
nature to the government: “A bank is wholly a creature of
statute doing business by legislative grace, and the right to
carry on a banking business through the agency of a
corporation is a ‘franchise’ right dependent on a grant of
corporate powers by the state.”21 Furthering the need for
banking regulation is the function of a bank as a corporation
whose aim is to make money for its shareholders.22 The
Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company
held that a corporation’s principal aim is to make money for
its shareholders and the firm’s decision making should be
catered to that end.23 Some banks will take huge “risks that
pay when times are good”24 in order to increase stock prices
and dividends for the satisfaction of their shareholders (and
employees and directors).25 However risk-taking banks that
fail may require bailouts when their investments do not
succeed and those bailouts become a heavy cost and burden
for taxpayers.26

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

DEVINE & ERNEST, supra note 11, at 18.
Id. at 7, 18.
See id. at 18.
Id. at 23.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (9th ed. 2009).
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson).
Id.
Id.
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Scholars make two primary counterarguments against
banking regulation. First, it is posited that shareholders,
directors, and employees who gain relatively large profits
captured by risky investments will reinvest, boosting the
American economy.27 However, with a real and growing
international market providing an avenue for people to place
money overseas, more profits will flow outside of the country
rather than being reinvested domestically.28 The second,
equally defunct, argument is that the economy’s cyclical
nature will neutralize the banks’ losses and gains. In reality,
the majority of gains stay with the rich29 while the burden of
losses—in the form of federal bank bailouts—is borne by all
economic classes; forcing lower classes to bear the brunt of
banks’ risky and failed decisions without reaping any of the
profits.
C. History of Banking Regulation and Deregulation
Banking regulation became a priority concern for the
federal government after the Great Depression in 1933.30 The
government proceeded to pass multiple banking statutes,
including one in the same year as the Glass-Seagull Act
(GSA)31 discussed infra.32
Following a strong start, banking regulation grew
increasingly lenient over the decades.33
Banks were
deregulated to allow growth through increased latitude.34
The aims of banking deregulation were “efficiency and
coherence in the regulation of [banks]”35 and materialized in
three main areas of banking:
(i) [T]he deregulation of products, including (e.g., deposit
interest rates and securities activities of banks);

27. See id. at 46–47.
28. DEVINE & ERNEST, supra note 11, at 20.
29. Id.
30. MALLOY, supra note 13, at 111.
31. Banking Act of 1933, c. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, CONCISE HORNBOOK
SERIES: PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 206 (2d ed. 2003).
32. See infra Part I.D.1.
33. See MALLOY, supra note 13, at 111.
34. See id. Deregulation is a movement encompassing more than just
banking and has affected all facets of the economy. Randall S. Kroszner, The
Motivations Behind Banking Reform, 24 REG. 36, 36 (2001).
35. MALLOY, supra note 13, at 111.
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(ii) [D]eregulation of markets, allowing more freedom to
banks to engage in banking on an interstate basis; and,
(iii) [S]tructural deregulation, reforming the structure of
bank regulation itself into a more coherent system.36

This loosening of government control granted banks the
Banking statute
necessary freedom to burgeon.37
modifications spanning the past eighty years, following the
above-stated aims, exhibited the continuous deregulation of
the banking industry. Five banking statutes are presented in
the following section to portray the evolution of the history of
banking history from regulation to deregulation.38
D. Relevant Banking Statutes
1. The Glass-Steagall Act (GSA)
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act on June 16, 1933
as the Banking Act of 1933 in response to the securities fraud
and deception at the root of the Great Depression.39 The
mandates of the GSA were two-fold. They extricated the
regulatory treatment of investment banks from commercial
banks, and limited commercial bank activity in securities
markets.40
The United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Investment Company Institute v. Camp describes the possible
apprehension of a marriage still alive thirty-eight years after
the GSA’s enactment. Investment companies in Investment
Company Institute argued for the freedom of national banks
to operate mutual funds, in effect, granting them the power of
investment banks.41 The Court, however, did not accord them
such freedom. The resulting close relationship between
commercial and investment banks would violate the GSA and
the Court feared potential repercussions.42 Since commercial

36. Id.
37. See id. A subsequent analysis will employ parts of these statutes to
evaluate TBTF bank mergers.
38. See infra Part I.D.
39. Id. at 207; Banking Act of 1933, c. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
40. Banking Act of 1933, c. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); MALLOY, supra note 31, at 208.
41. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1971).
42. Id. at 639.
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banks hold public money, failure would have been ruinous.
As a result, commercial banks were kept separate from
institutions involved in more risky investments such as
investment companies.43 The passage of the Gramm-LeachBliley Financial Modernization Act in 1999 later nullified the
Court’s ruling.
2. The Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)
The BHCA was passed on May 9, 1956 and required the
Federal Reserve Board to approve the creation of bank
holding companies (BHCs),44 A BHC is defined within the
statute as “any company which has control over any bank or
over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company
by virtue of this chapter.”45 Congress also installed a vital
prohibition creating an inherent limitation on bank size. The
BHCA prohibited banks established in different states from
acquiring each other.46
3. The Bank Merger Act (BMA)
The BMA, effective May 13, 1960,47 “prohibit[ed] mergers,
consolidations, and purchases of assets with assumption of
liabilities, as between banks, unless . . . prior written
approval of the appropriate federal bank regulatory agency
ha[d] been obtained.”48 The BMA was not originally used to
examine the anticompetitive nature of bank mergers;49 the
government instead used section 7 of the Clayton Act to
analyze the potential risk. Section 7 stated,
No person engaged in commerce . . . shall acquire . . . the
whole or any part of . . . another person engaged also in
commerce . . . where in any line of commerce or in . . . any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
43. See id. at 637–38.
44. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, c. 240, § 1, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–44, 1846–48, 1851–52 (1996)); Important
Banking Legislation, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/important/
index.html (last updated May 15, 2007) (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MAJOR
STATUTES AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS (2004)).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006).
46. Id.
47. Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2006)); MALLOY, supra note 31, at 133.
48. MALLOY, supra note 13, at 295 (citation omitted).
49. MALLOY, supra note 31, at 133.
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a monopoly.50

The BMA was later amended in 1966 to deal with bank
merger antitrust analysis.51 In order to decide a bank
merger’s legality, the following factors are weighed:
(1) Monopolization.
The agency cannot approve a
proposed transaction that would result in a monopoly, or
that would be in furtherance of any combination or
conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the
business of banking in any part of the United States.52
(2) Anticompetitiveness. The agency cannot approve a
proposed transaction the effect of which in any section of
the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly, or that in any other manner
would be in restraint of trade.53
(3) Traditional Banking Factors. The agency must take
into consideration the financial and managerial resources
and the future prospects of the existing and proposed
institutions, and the convenience and needs of the
community to be served. In addition, the responsible
agency must take into consideration in every case the
effectiveness of any insured depository institution
involved in the proposed merger in combating money
laundering activities, including in overseas branches.54

These factors are essential to deciding a bank merger’s
authorization. They are discussed infra to analyze the
soundness of TBTF bank mergers.55
4. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act (RNIA)
The RNIA, passed by Congress on September 29, 1994,
requires banks to hold no less than ninety percent of their

50. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
51. MALLOY, supra note 31, at 135.
52. Id. at 137; see 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A) (2006).
53. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2006). However unlike Philadelphia
National Bank, the BMA “permits approval of such a transaction if the agency
finds that its anticompetitive effects ‘are clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.’ ” MALLOY, supra note 31, at 138.
54. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2006).
55. For the three factors used to analyze TBTF bank mergers, see infra Part
III.C.3.
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total retail deposits.56 It was designed to ensure banks would
have adequate reserves available for a sudden run on the
bank. “This cap was not related to antitrust concerns as ten
percent of a national market is too low to imply pricing power.
Rather this was a sensible macro-prudential preventive
measure—do[] [not] put all your eggs in one basket.”57
However, this law is ineffective and limited for two
reasons: “(1) The growth of big banks was not fueled by retail
deposits but rather by various forms of ‘wholesale’ financing,
and (2) [t]he cap was not enforced by lax regulators, so that
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo all
received waivers in recent years.”58 With banks outgrowing
the statute’s safeguards, and lenient enforcement impeding
efficacy, the RNIA has become dated and unworkable.
5. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
Act (GLBA)
The GLBA, passed on November 12, 1999,59 played a
central role in bank deregulation because it “repealed [GSA]
prohibitions on affiliations between commercial and
investment banking enterprises . . . .”60 It permitted banks to
act as Financial Holding Companies, allowing them to
“engage in activities, and acquire companies engaged in
activities, that are ‘financial in nature’ or that are incidental
to such activities.”61 This law opened the door for banks to

56. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
12, 31, 112 U.S.C.); Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon
Johnson).
57. Id.
58. Id. Wholesale financing involves “[t]he sale of securities among brokerdealers and large institutional investors. Securities sold at wholesale go for
slightly lower prices than those paid by individual investors.” Wholesale, THE
FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/wholesale
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
59. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.); MALLOY, supra note
31, at 206–07.
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(1) (1999)). An FHC is defined as “[a]
financial institution engaged in nonbanking activities that offers customers a
wide range of financial services, including the opportunity to purchase
insurance products and invest in securities.” Financial Holding Company
(FHC), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-holdingcompany-FHC.asp#axzz1eYZy9AOv (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
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invest in home mortgages, which were problematic financial
activities prominent in the Great Recession.
E. Evolution of Banking
Deregulation of banks, combined with overall market
globalization, altered the nature of banking. Commercial
banks merged with investment companies and invested in
capital markets, taking full advantage of their privileges.62
Recognizing these changes is indispensible to understanding
TBTF banks’ construct and emergence.
1. Investment Companies as Bank Holding Companies
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, not BHCs until
recently, generate profits from investments.63 Bestowing the
BHC designation upon investment companies, such as
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, provides them with
protection in the form of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (FDIC) deposit insurance. Credit extensions
provided by the Federal Reserve Board are also made
available to investment banks turned BHCs.64 In return,
BHCs subject themselves to additional government
regulation, including increased government oversight over
capitalization.65
2. Bank Involvement in Capital Market Funding
The sizable amount of available assets in capital markets
presents banks with a lucrative investment opportunity. A
capital market is “any market where a government or a
company [in this case a bank] can raise money (capital) to
fund their operations and long term investment[s].”66 Bond
62. Sewall Chan, U.S.: Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on Banks’ Size,
CORPWATCH (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15567.
63. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson) (“[A]
bank such as Goldman Sachs now has full access to the Federal [Reserve’s]
discount window (as a bank holding company)—yet also retains the ability to
make risky investments of all kinds anywhere in the world (as it did when it
was an investment bank, before September 2008). In a very real sense, the US
government is now backing the world’s largest speculative investment funds—
without any effective oversight mechanisms.”).
64. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release,
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/press/bcreg/20080921a.htm.
65. See id.
66. Mike
Moffatt,
What
Are
Capital
Markets?,
ABOUT.COM,
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and stock markets are the most widely known examples.67
In Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts,68
authors Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, posited the possible
advantages of capital market funding:
[G]reater reliance on capital markets could reduce an
institution’s chance of failure. Capital market funding can
be cheaper and allow for more effective and diversified
management of liquidity. The more arenas in which a
bank can raise funds, the more likely it can survive a
cutoff from a single source.69

Regardless of the ability to diversify funds and spread risks
through capital markets, banks must be wary of the risk they
present. The risk lying in these markets is their inherent
volatility.70 Capital market funding can “increase instability
Capital market
by quickening the pace of failure.”71
companies cause this “quickened pace” because they are
“quicker than other sources to restrict the quantity of funds
they provide banks.”72 The failure of the Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago forewarns
against relying too heavily on “extensive capital market
funding.”73
Continental Illinois’ failure lives on in bank infamy. Its
failure was the biggest American bank failure to date in
1984.74 At that time, it was the seventh largest bank in the
nation with almost forty billion dollars in assets and over
thirty billion dollars in deposits.75 A run on the bank forced

http://economics.about.com/od/financialmarkets/f/capital_markets.htm
(last
visited Apr. 17, 2012).
67. Id.
68. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2.
69. Id. at 68.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 69.
73. Id.
74. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
EXPERIENCE 545 (1998). Washington Mutual’s failure in 2009, later eclipsed
Continental Illinois’ failure. Francine McKenna, What I Learned Working at the
Original Too Big to Fail Bank, AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 23, 2011, 10:38 AM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Continental-Illinois-Too-Big-toFail-1045154-1.html.
75. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 74, at 546; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-96, STAFF STUDY: FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT: FOUR
FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1980S 36 (1997).
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the FDIC to seize Continental Illinois Bank.76 During the
bank’s bailout, the forbidding term—Too Big to Fail—was
first used.77
II. TOO BIG TO FAIL
A. TBTF Banks
Part I began with an exploration of United States’
banking history and its current state. Part II will tackle the
task at hand, TBTF banks. These banks’ failures would be so
disastrous the government could not afford to let them fail.78
The dilemma presented by TBTF banks’ size initially went
unnoticed by certain legislative members. During the bailout
of the Continental Illinois Bank, Congressman Stewart
McKinney praised these huge banks:
[W]e have a new kind of bank. And today there is
another type [of bank] created. We found it in the thrift
institutions, and now we have given approval for a $1
billion brokerage deal to the Financial Corporation of
America. Mr. Chairman, let us not bandy words. We have
a new kind of bank. It is called too big to fail. TBTF, and
it is a wonderful bank.79

After the financial crisis of the late 2000s, politicians ceased
touting them.80
Both local and nationwide banks have failed in the recent
financial collapse.81 “Some banks fail[ed] without notice.
Other failing banks capture[d] the attention of policymakers,
often because of the bank’s large size and significant role in
the financial system.”82 The large nationwide TBTF banks,
however, have raised the most alarm among economists,
world leaders, and the public because of the extent of the
possible detrimental effects they can have on the economy.83
TBTF also represents a financial school of thought. “A
TBTF regime is a policy environment in which uninsured

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 74, at 547–63.
STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 13.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
See Volcker Rules, supra note 16 (statement of Simon Johnson).
Id. at 45.
STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 2.
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creditors expect the government to protect them from
prospective losses [and prevent] the failure of a big bank; big
banks are said to be too big to fail in countries following such
a regime.”84 Stern and Feldman wrote the TBTF doctrine
included, “(1) [A] policy of protecting uninsured creditors at
banks from the losses they might suffer and (2) a definition of
big bank[s].”85 If TBTF banks—such as Bank of America, J.P.
Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo—were allowed to collapse, it
would affect America’s economy too drastically because of
their dominance within it.86 When these banks are bailed out
uninsured creditors, investing more than the FDIC insured
$250,000,87 are protected by the government.88 The taxgenerated bailout funding89 essentially uses taxpayer money
as a safety net for banks walking the tightrope of risky,
leveraged investments.90
B. Concerns
“[T]he largest [six] banks in our economy now have total
assets in excess of [sixty-three] percent GDP [Gross Domestic
Product]”91 as of September 30, 2010.92 These banks are:
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo,
These large
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.93
controllers of American assets evolved through a series of
mergers between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch,94 J.P.

84. Id. at 13.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 12–13; infra Part II.B.
87. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, http://www.fdic.gov/ (last
visited Apr. 17, 2012).
88. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 12.
89. See Chan, supra note 62.
90. See STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 11. Leveraged is defined as
using borrowed money “to increase potential return on investment.” Leverage,
INVESTOPIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp#axzz1pPY18jkJ
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
91. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 45.
92. Id.
93. Robert Lenzner, Six Giant Banks Made $51 Billion Last Year; The Other
980 Lost Money: An Oligopoly of Goldman, BofA, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley,
Citi, and Wells Fargo Is Flourishing, FORBES (June 3, 2010, 1:25 PM)
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/03/goldman-sachs-citigroup-markets-lenznermorgan-stanley.html. An up-to-date list is located at Top 50 BHCs, FED. FIN.
INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL: NAT’L INFO. CTR., http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpub
web/nicweb/top50form.aspx (last updated Mar. 31, 2012).
94. Chan, supra note 62.
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Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns,95 and Wells Fargo and
Wachovia.96 By “controlling” sixty-three percent of the United
States’ GDP, these banks are vital to the U.S. economy.97
Their dominance, conjuring up memories of the past powerful
American car and steel industries, also brings fears of the
possible failure which could have dire effects on job
availability, domestic dollar power, and the strength of the
dollar abroad.98
C. Effects Felt During the Financial Crisis of the Late 2000s
The repercussions of the TBTF banks’ failed risky
investments have been catastrophic.99 “Revised data will
likely show more than 8 million net jobs lost since December
2007, due to more than a decade of reckless risk-taking
involving large financial institutions.”100 The driving force
behind the Financial Crisis of the late 2000s was the collapse
of the housing and credit “bubble” within the United States.101
This “bubble” inflated to dangerous levels because America’s
economy
was
following
the
economic
trend
of
financialization.102 “The financialization of capitalism—the
shift in gravity of economic activity from production (and even
from much of the growing service sector) to finance—is thus
one of the key issues of our time,” commented John Foster,
Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon.103 As a
result of the shift, economic success now primarily depends on
the financial sector, including commercial and investment
banks.104

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
See Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 45 (statement of Simon Johnson).
See id. at 45–46.
See id.
Id. at 46.
Ben S. Bernanke, Four Questions about the Financial Crisis, FED.
RESERVE (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20090414a.htm.
102. John Bellamy Foster, The Financialization of Capitalization, 58
MONTHLY REVIEW, Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.greeneconomics
.net/Financialization.pdf; John Bellamy Foster, SOCIOLOGY.UOREGON.EDU,
http://sociology.uoregon.edu/faculty/foster.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
103. Foster, supra note 102, at 1.
104. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.
html?offset=0&s=newest.
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Both types of banks, taking advantage of consequent
freedoms due to deregulation, undertook unwise risks.105
Investment banks, not being subject to the same regulations
as commercial banks, amassed huge amounts of debt while
still lending to people and corporations.106 They then lacked
the reserves to cover massive losses resulting from defaulted
loans.107 The shortage prevented banks from making further
loans and halted the economy.108
D. Bailout Money: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
In 2008, the government made the difficult but necessary
choice to bailout multiple banks, including TBTF banks, in
order to avoid total financial collapse.109 Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Paulson presented TARP to the nation
TARP, the most memorable bank bailout, on September 19,
2008.110 It allowed the “Department of the Treasury to
purchase or insure up to $700 billion of troubled assets.”111
Congress defined troubled assets as:
(1) Residential or commercial mortgages and any
securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based
on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was
originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the
purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes
financial market stability; and
(2) [A]ny other financial instrument that the Secretary,
after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial
market stability, but only upon transmittal of such
determination, in writing, to the appropriate committees
of Congress.112

The Treasury infused capital into failing banks by buying
their assets and bad debt.113 It has bought twenty-five billion
dollars worth of assets and bad debt of Citigroup, J.P. Morgan
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson).
See Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, supra note 104.
See id.
See id.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1.
ANDREW ROSS STORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 446 (2009).
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1.
Id.
See id.
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Chase, and Wells Fargo; fifteen billion dollars of Bank of
America; and ten billion dollars of Goldman Sachs.114
E. Viability
Before analyzing TBTF banks, it is important to
contemplate their overall feasibility. Arguments of Simon
Johnson, the Chief Economist of the International Monetary
Fund from August 2007 to August 2008, and Edward Kane,
renowned Professor of Finance at Boston College, debunking
the theories of advantageous economies of scale displayed by
TBTF banks, global competitiveness, and efficiency are
presented.115 An investigation of a bank merger’s effects on a
loan offering, providing real evidence of the sensibility in
these bank mergers, concludes this section.
1. Economies of Scale
Large banks would be expected to offer economies of
scale, but there is little supporting evidence of them
exhibiting this financial advantage.116 Economies of scale is
defined as “a situation in which a firm can increase its output
more than proportionally to its total input cost.”117 If a large
bank follows the economic theory it should be able to more
efficiently serve (at lower production costs) its consumers as it
increases its number of services and account holders. Simon
Johnson wrote, “There is no evidence for economies of scale in
banking over $100 billion of total assets.”118 This absence is
caused by the bank’s assets becoming so large that its
dealings became unmanageable. The bank can then no
longer
consider
the
welfare
of
its
customers.119
“[U]nprecedented consolidation in the financial sector over
the previous decade ha[s] led to no significant efficiency
gains, no economies of scale beyond a low threshold, and no

114. Id. at 2.
115. Simon Johnson, MIT.EDU, http://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty/detail.php?in
_spseqno=198 (last visited Apr. 17, 2012); Edward J. Kane, BC.EDU,
https://www2.bc.edu/~kaneeb/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
116. See Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46–47 (statement of Simon
Johnson).
117. EDGAR K. BROWNING & MARK A. ZUPAN, MACROECONOMICS: THEORY &
APPLICATIONS 220 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 9th ed. 2006).
118. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson).
119. Id.
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evident economies of scope.”120
Edward Kane disclaimed large banks enjoying economies
of scale:
Since large banks exhibit constant returns to scale (they
are no more or less efficient as they grow larger), and we
know that large banks enjoy a subsidy due to being too big
to fail, “offsetting diseconomies must exist in the operation
of large institutions”—that is without the “too big to fail
subsidy,” large banks would actually be less efficient than
midsize banks.121

Large banks increasing in size do not evidence rising
efficiency,122 rather there must be increasing inefficiencies
within larger banks offsetting the economies of scale
efficiencies they should be experiencing.123 Kane finds the
involution and magnitude of TBTF banks to be culpable for
the apparent lack of economies of scale.124 The cumbersome
internal structure of TBTF banks offsets their would-be
relative efficiency advantage.125
“[B]ig banks [are able to] provide benefits to the economy
that cannot be provided by smaller banks.”126 Large banks
possess a quasi-national system enabling them to provide
services to account holders spanning the entire country.
Nationwide Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) exemplify a
benefit of this system.127 Large banks also have increased
networks and cash reserves enabling them, in theory, to give
larger loans.128
These increased offerings to customers

120. Id. (citing ROGER W. FERGUSON JR. ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY 93–94 (2007)). “Economies of scope” is defined as “a case where it is
cheaper for one firm to produce products jointly than it is for separate firms to
produce the same products independently.” BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note
117, at 229.
121. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 47 (statement of Simon Johnson) (citing
Edward J. Kane, Extracting Nontransparent Safety Net Subsidies by
Strategically Expanding and Contracting a Financial Institution’s Accounting
Balance Sheet, 36 J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 161–68 (2009)). Diseconomies of
scale describes the opposite situation where a firm produces less efficiently as
increases its production. BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 117, at 220. Large
banks display diseconomies of scale rather than desired economies of scale.
122. Kane, supra note 121, at 162.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson).
127. See id.
128. Id. For a case of a merged and subsequently larger bank offering a
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evidence big banks “enjoy[ing] [] economies of scale” enabled
by increased efficiency.129 Regardless, the TBTF banks’ risks
still outweigh these above-discussed benefits.130 The simple
adage of “the bigger the bank, the bigger the gains”131 no
longer holds true.
2. Global Competition
Simon Johnson presents the following argument for large
banks: “global competitiveness of U.S. corporations requires
American banks to be at least as big as the banks in any
other country.”132 While partially true, the financial collapse
was suffered worldwide133 and operating well in a defunct
system does not alter (or improve) the state of being defunct.
Other countries, England for example, admitted their
banking systems demand drastic overhaul.134 The Bank of
England termed the bailing out of increasingly bigger banks
as the “doom loop.”135 Andy Haldane, Bank of England’s
Executive Director for Financial Stability, and Pier Giorgio
Alessandri, Bank of England Economist,136 argued
governments’ repeated bank bail outs cripple their stance of
“never again[,] . . . add[ing] to the cost of future crises. And
the larger these costs, the lower the credibility of ‘never again’
announcements. This is a doom loop.” 137
Large international corporations spanning multiple
countries do have “global financing needs.”138 However, one
bank does not exclusively provide all of a Multinational
smaller loan amount post merger than the two prior individual banks, see supra
Part II.E.4.
129. Id.
130. See supra Part II.B.
131. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 45.
135. Edmund Conway, Bank of England Says Financiers are Fuelling an
Economic ‘Doom Loop,’ THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2009, 11:50 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/6516579/Bankof-England-says-financiers-are-fuelling-an-economic-doom-loop.html.
136. Andy Haldane - Executive Director Financial Stability, BANK OF
ENGLAND,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/people/biographies/
haldane.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2012); Piergiorgio Alessandri, BANK OF
ENGLAND,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/economists/staff/
piergiorgio_alessandri_publications.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
137. Conway, supra note 135.
138. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 47 (statement of Simon Johnson).
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Corporation’s (MNC) services.139 Instead, MNCs rely on
“syndicates of banks for major offerings of equity or debt.”140
Most corporations would prefer not to rely on a single bank.141
They wish to capitalize on each bank’s specializations, as well
as protect themselves from bank failure.142 Simon Johnson
wrote, “U.S. corporations already benefit from competition
between U.S. and foreign banks, which can provide identical
financial products; there is no reason to believe that the
global competitiveness of our non-financial sector depends on
our having the world’s largest banks.”143 That being said,
U.S. banks must be large enough to compete with the large
foreign banks to provide this “global competitiveness” for
corporations.
3. What Is This Really About?: Competition v. Efficiency
Arguments regarding big banks can be boiled down to the
timeless tug-of-war between competition and efficiency.
Competition, in theory, protects the buyer by discouraging
monopolies, enabling sellers to charge higher prices.
Efficiency, a by-product of bank mergers, spreads fixed costs,
decreases costs due to competition, and offers greater
economies of scale, the benefits of which are theoretically
passed on to the buyer.
Previously, the efficiency
consideration was heavily favored because larger banks’
positive effects were narrowly considered. Now, current
economic reality is driving the promotion of competitiveness.
4. Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE) Case
CCE’s experience reveals bank mergers’ potential
consequences for borrowers.144 CCE held separate credit lines
with NationsBank and Bank of America.145 The two banks
decided to combine.146 Following the banks’ merger, CCE
could only acquire a loan amounting to half of what the pre-

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Jathon Sapsford & Paul Sherer, Deals & Deal Makers: Fewer Banks
Mean Costlier Credit Lines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at C1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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merger banks had previously offered.147 The amalgamation
reduced—and with regards to these two banks removed—
CCE’s ability to procure a larger credit line by initiating loan
relationships with multiple banks.148 CCE was formerly able
to benefit from the bank competition.
Depending from whose viewpoint you are looking, CCE’s
loan outcome is either encouraging or discouraging. On one
hand, the banks were able to reduce a risk they possibly
should not have taken previously. Banks had the opportunity
to accurately assess a borrower’s viability instead of muddling
numbers to extend an ill-advisedly large loan in hopes of
defeating the competition. Conversely, the borrower had
fewer options for procurement of the loan and received a
reduced loan.
III. ANALYSIS OF TBTF BANK MERGERS
A. TBTF Bank Mergers
During 2008, multiple nationwide TBTF banks merged:
Bank of America “swallowed” Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan
Chase bought Bear Stearns and joined Washington Mutual,
and Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia.149 Permitting these
mergers only augmented the risks posed by TBTF banks as
their increased size heightened the consequences of
prospective failure. An analysis of the TBTF bank mergers
will help answer the question posed at the beginning of this
comment—should the government have allowed them to take
place?
B. Tools Used in Analysis
Antitrust law and BMA factors are the analytic tools
used to evaluate the government sanction of these TBTF
bank mergers.
Antitrust law protects competition by
preventing agreements unreasonably restraining trade150 and
can be used to assess TBTF bank mergers’ legality. The
Warren Court in Brown Shoe Company v. United States151
147. Id.
148. Id. It is important to note a market shift could have contributed to the
altered credit line offer as well.
149. Chan, supra note 62.
150. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
151. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 294 (1962).
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explained the test for antitrust analysis: whether the effect of
the merger may substantially lessen competition in any line
of commerce in any section of the country.152 Congress later
codified this test in section 7 of the Clayton Act.153 In United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank the same Warren Court
applied antitrust laws to bank mergers.154
A bank merger is judged by BMA factors in order to
assess its possible anticompetitive nature. Its authorization
turns on the result of that analysis.155 The factors of
monopolization,156 anticompetitiveness,157 and traditional
banking factors are weighed by the court.158 Applying these
factors to TBTF bank mergers will determine whether they
violated the BMA and if they discourage competition.159
C. Analysis
An analysis of whether these TBTF bank mergers violate
antitrust laws begins with first determining whether
antitrust laws apply to the banks or if the banks are shielded
by antitrust immunity. If antitrust laws do apply, it is
essential to determine the relevant market for banks,
including both their product and geographic markets.
Ultimately, BMA factors are employed to evaluate the
mergers’ potential anticompetitive nature.
1. Do Banks Have Implied Antitrust Immunity for
Merger Analysis?
i.

Philadelphia National Bank Court Says No

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank is the
hallmark case involving bank mergers.160 The Court ruled
against a merger of two banks, Philadelphia National Bank
and Girard Trust Corn Exchange, because the merger would
discourage competition, violating section 7 of the Clayton
152. Id. at 328; 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2011); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
154. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 338–43.
155. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 316–23.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A) (2006); see supra Part I.D.3.
157. § 1828(c)(5)(B); see supra Part I.D.3.
158. § 1828(c)(5)(B); see supra Part I.D.3.
159. See infra Part III.C.3.
160. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 321 (1963).
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The banks claimed section 7 relief because of
Act.161
But the
burdensome government banking regulation.162
Court held government regulation did not grant them
immunization.163
ii. Antitrust Savings Clause
The BHCA contains an antitrust savings clause—
“[N]othing in this Act shall exempt any [BHC] involved in
such a transaction from complying with the antitrust laws
after the consummation of such transaction.”164 This further
confirms the application of antitrust laws to bank mergers.
This same reasoning is applied to the antitrust savings clause
in the telecommunications industry.
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP is the seminal telecommunications case
regarding the implementation of the antitrust savings
clause.165 The Rehnquist Court held industry regulation did
not bar application of antitrust laws.166 An antitrust savings
clause within the applicable 1996 Telecommunications Act
preserved application.167 The savings clause was as follows:
“Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act
shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”168
The prior stated BHCA antitrust savings clause
expressed similar language and intent.169
The BHCA
required bank mergers to comply with antitrust laws in
addition to its guidelines.170 Refusal of antitrust immunity
was in accordance with Federal Reserve Chairman at the
time William Martin’s belief that the Attorney General, the
government body that enforces antitrust provisions, should
Martin
retain full authority under the Clayton Act.171
161. Id. at 371–72.
162. Id. at 368.
163. Id. at 350, 354.
164. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (2006).
165. Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 398 (2004).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 406.
169. § 1849(b).
170. See id.
171. See Current Antitrust Problems: Hearing Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
(Subcomm. No. 5) of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 2173 (1955)
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granted government permission to analyze bank mergers
according to BMA factors.172
2. The Relevant Market
Defining the relevant market is the first stage in
antitrust analysis.173 The relevant market is defined as “a
product or group of products and a geographic area in which
[two or more businesses’ products are] produced or sold.”174 It
can be broken down into the product and the geographic
market.175
Designating the product market determines
substitutability between the companies’ goods.176 The court
decides the product market by assessing the potential change
in a consumer’s purchasing habits in reaction to “a small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price.”177
As
mentioned supra, the geographic market comprises the area
in which the businesses produce or sell their products.178
The present relevant market is composed of the TBTF
banks’ product and geographic markets.
Their product
market must now include loans and investments made by
both commercial and investment banks. TBTF banks would
argue the geographic market should be worldwide because of
their international clientele.
This international market
would suggest the banks are competing internationally and
hence lessen the impact of a merger’s anticompetitive effects.
A narrower, national market is more precise. While acting in
their commercial banking capacity American TBTF banks
serve primarily domestic customers. The BMA analysis
conducted below will assume a national market.

(statement of William Martin, Federal Reserve Board Chairman).
172. Id. at 2170.
173. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404
(1956).
174. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, BANK MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS HANDBOOK 113 (2006); DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 4 (1992, rev. 1997), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
175. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 174, at 113.
176. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
177. Id. at 9.
178. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 174, at 113.
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3. BMA Factors
i.

Monopolization

There is no American banking monopoly,179 nor is there
an oligopoly,180 as there are still numerous distinctly owned
banks in the United States.
Though an attempt to
monopolize the banking industry is conceivable in the near
future as large banks grow increasingly stronger, making it
ever more difficult for smaller banks to compete.
“Undersized” banks cannot contend with expanding TBTF
banks because the larger banks offer credit card deals,
national ATMs, and loans the smaller banks cannot
provide.181 At present, however, there is no monopolization
created by TBTF bank mergers.
ii. Anticompetitiveness
Mergers creating large national banks generate anticompetitiveness. They lessen the number of competing banks
in the United States. Further, large banks are evolving into
national banks and only other like-sized institutions can truly
contend. These national banks presently vie for customers,
but diminished rivalry will result as TBTF banks’ continue
their amalgamation. The merged institutions have created a
highly concentrated American bank market, fostering
unhealthy competition. “The big four [banks] have half of the
market for mortgages and two-thirds of the market for credit
cards. Five banks have over [ninety-five] percent of the
market for over-the-counter derivatives. Three U.S. banks
have over [forty] percent of the global market for stock
underwriting.”182 The market power of TBTF banks, in the
words of Simon Johnson, is “dangerous.”183
Several arguments support the creation of large banks.
Arguably, the increased market power allows TBTF banks to
accomplish more because they spend less resources, time and
money, competing. The increased productivity of these banks
179. A monopoly would involve a single bank meeting all of the country’s
banking needs. See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 117, at 312.
180. A bank oligopoly would involve a few banks providing all of the banking
services for the entire nation. See id. at 375.
181. See sources cited supra notes 126–29; supra Part II.E.1.
182. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson).
183. Id. at 45.
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benefits the whole country because these are American
banks.184 Randall Kroszner, Professor of Economics at the
University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business,185 stated,
Branching deregulation tends to reduce banks’ local
market power and improves conditions for borrowers.
Although not without controversy, a number of studies
have shown that lending to small businesses increases on
average when banking organizations purchase small
banks, and credit availability to small businesses
increases in the years following banking organizations’
takeover of small banks.186

However, large bank mergers also have negative effects on
customers. Some of these negative effects are explored below.
Bank mergers enable the unified entities to raise loan
rates because of less inter-bank competition for customers.187
The resulting decreased loan amount in the CCE Case,
discussed supra, illustrates another possible negative effect of
these unions.188 “Bank mergers lead to higher interest rates
and diminished economic conditions.”189 Increased prices for
bank customers and reduced competition between banks
worsen economic conditions. People become less likely to
procure bank loans and then reinvest that money into the
economy by starting new businesses or buying products.
“[H]igher real estate loan rates [are] associated with
bank mergers”190 and “bank mergers influence deposit rates to
the detriment of depositors.”191 As a result of decreased
competition, banks face a reduced risk of losing customers as
a consequence of increasing their real estate loan rates.192
Bank mergers result in diminished bank “operating
efficiency”193 evidencing a lack of economies of scope. Banks
display economies of scope when they can provide services

184. See id. at 46–47.
185. Randall S. Kroszner, CHICAGOBOOTH.EDU, http://www.chicagobooth
.edu/faculty/bio.aspx?person_id=12825212928 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
186. Kroszner, supra note 34, at 38.
187. Donald R. Fraser et al., Market Power, Bank Megamergers, and the
Welfare of Bank Borrowers, 34 J. FIN. RES. 641, 646 (2011).
188. See Part II.E.4.
189. Fraser et al., supra note 187, at 646.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 647.
192. See id. at 646–47.
193. Id. at 647.
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more efficiently (at less cost) “jointly” than separately.194
Actually diseconomies of scope195 are revealed, “lead[ing] to
higher loan rates and/or lower deposit rates.”196 Convincing
evidence exists pointing to TBTF bank mergers discouraging
competition.
iii. Traditional Banking Factors
The BMA considers “the financial and managerial
resources and the future prospects of the existing and
proposed institutions and the convenience and needs of the
community to be served.”197 These traditional banking factors
are indispensable to the analysis of TBTF banks. Banks
investing in risky markets and then receiving government
bailouts when they fail do not benefit the community for two
reasons. First, taxpayers bear the burden of expensing that
bailout. Second, a very real incentive pressuring these banks
to make safer investments is eliminated. TBTF banks may
lose customers due to unwise investments, but they do not
face a bona fide threat of failure. Moral hazard—“[t]he
tendency to incur risks that one is protected against”—is
bred.198 Bank bailouts have in effect removed an extremely
effective incentive for banks to make safer investments.199
TBTF banks pose an indisputable threat to the United States
economy and to the interests of the American people.
Furthermore, they lack a legitimate incentive to lessen that
threat.
4. Final Analysis
There is no current monopolization created by the TBTF
bank mergers; however, there is compelling evidence they
discourage competition. Applying the TBTF bank mergers to
the traditional banking factors illuminates that they are not
serving the community’s—that is the United States’—
194. See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 117, at 229.
195. Banks experience diseconomies of scope when separate banks can
provide services more efficiently (at less cost) separately than “jointly.” See id.
196. Fraser et al., supra note 187, at 647.
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2006); see supra Part I.D.3.
198. ALAN C. SHAPIRO & ATULYA SARIN, FOUNDATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 527 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 6th ed. 2009).
199. “Capitalism without failure is like religion without sin. It doesn’t work.
Bankruptcies and losses concentrate the mind on prudent behavior.” Id. at 68
n.1 (quoting economist Allan H. Meltzer).
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interests. Their potential failure greatly encumbers the
public in the form of taxes for bailout money and detrimental
effects on the economy. TBTF bank mergers violate the BMA
and should not have been allowed.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES
Because these bank mergers violated antitrust laws,
stark changes must be made to their product, the TBTF
banks. This revamping could be achieved through the
enforcement of an additional BMA traditional banking factor.
Currently the traditional banking factors do not expressly
account for future ramifications. Foreseeing future adverse
effects, such as the dire economic effects, manifest clearly
that the “needs of the community” are not best served by
TBTF bank mergers. Further, TBTF banks must be divided
to create smaller and hence more manageable banks.
The “needs of the community” factor can be utilized to
determine a reasonable and enforceable bank size restriction.
In the interests of the community, the government must
create and implement this cap size. Determination of an
appropriate cap size is a complex issue beyond this
Comment’s breadth, but a system of regional banks,
apportioned by time zone, would be a sensible start. This
crucial restriction will limit bank size and increase
competition in an effort to save the American economy from
future disasters. “Without a size cap on individual bank size,
[the United States] will move towards the highly dangerous
situation that prevails in some parts of Western Europe—
where individual banks hold assets worth more (at least on
paper, during a boom) than their home country’s GDP.”200
This is valid cause for worry because this power gives banks
the ability to take immense, perilous risks.201
These
institutions’ growth must be confined, particularly
considering the government and, ultimately, taxpayers fund
their risk and potential failure.
The GLBA needs to be retracted, and the GSA should be
reinstated. Separating commercial banks from investment
banks would be both physically and legally prudent. It will
advance their regulation by constructing more transparent
200. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 45 (statement of Simon Johnson).
201. See id. at 45–46.
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and effective distinct controlling statutes.
An absolute
separation may be untenable, given the current global
marketplace demands, but efforts must be made to
distinguish two banks serving contradictory needs and
requiring divergent laws.
The RNIA must be expanded considering the evolution of
“wholesale financing.” Precise enlargement will predicate
upon GSA reinstatement that will, as stated above,
disentangle commercial banks from investment banks.
Currently, the RNIA’s ten percent deposit holding
requirement is inept at controlling TBTF banks in their
current construct. The improved restriction must encompass
money TBTF banks receive from wholesale financing.
CONCLUSION
Mergers creating TBTF banks violate the BMA. They are
anticompetitive and clearly not in the community’s best
interests.202 TBTF banks, through deregulation, have grown
beyond what the United States’ economy can safely sustain.203
Curtailing bank cap size is paramount to creating a more
manageable bank.204 The Legislature must revert to stricter
banking statutes. To not do so would evidence, borrowing
language from the Roberts Court, “systemic negligence”205 on
the government’s part. The Great Recession elucidated the
TBTF dilemma, and the Legislature’s failure to take
corrective and preventive action would be “grossly negligent
conduct”206 considering another economic collapse could only
be described as “circumstances recurring.”207
Increased regulation and restriction will help revive the
public’s trust in its government and banking system. With
the rise of globalization and increasing foreign competition,208
strengthened confidence in America’s political and economic
structure will be of the utmost importance.
Improved
banking regulation is a step towards stabilizing the future of
America’s economy and avoiding future financial collapse.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See supra Part III.C.4.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part IV.
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
Id.
Id.
SHAPIRO & SARIN, supra note 198, at 4.

